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REPLY TO BASINGER ON POWER ENTAILMENT
William Hasker
David Basinger has presented an interesting challenge to a central element in
my argument against middle knowledge. I Before addressing this challenge, however, I wish to correct two misconceptions about my view which are reflected
in Basinger's article. He represents me as holding that previous critics of middle
knowledge have not been successful (MKHF, p. 331), when actually I find some
of their arguments, paIticularly those presented by Robert Adams, to be forceful
and extremely convincing. 2 What I do say is that previous discussions are "inconclusive" (RMK, p. 547), and the reason I say this is that these arguments rest
on assumptions which proponents of middle knowledge are not obliged to accept;
thus, there is room and need for additional arguments such as the one I present.
But I do not think poorly of what others have done.
The other misconception is this: Basinger represents me as holding, not that
counterfactuals of freedom are false, but that they are incoherent (MKHF, p.
332). But I do hold that all such counterfactuals are false. In any counterfactual
situation in which a person would choose freely between various alternatives,
what is true is that if confronted with such a situation she might choose anyone
of the alternatives; it follows from this that any statement claiming that, if placed
in such a situation, she would definitely choose some particular alternative is
false. 3
Basinger proceeds by raising questions about my "power entailment principies," principles which are important not only for the present discussion but for
the controversy over divine foreknowledge and human freedom.4 The two principles given in RMK are:
(3)
(4)

If it is in A's power to bring it about that P, and "P" entails "Q"
and "Q" is false, then it is in A's power to bring it about that Q.
If it is in A's power to bring it about that P, and "P" entails "Q,"
then either it is in A's power to bring it about that Q, or the truth
of "Q" is a necessary condition of A's having the power to bring
it about that P. 5

Basinger is correct in noting that these principles are crucial to my argument
against middle knowledge. Indeed, given certain other assumptions (which
Basinger also accepts), these principles suffice to show that counterfactuals of
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freedom cannot be true." In his reply Basinger does not give any logical argument
against my principles, nor does he cite any counter-examples to them. Rather,
he presents a pair of principles of his own-principles which, he claims, are
equivalent to mine in most contexts, but which diverge in such a way as to allow
counterfactuals of freedom to be true. The proponent of middle knowledge, then,
is at liberty to accept Basinger's principles instead of mine, and thus to claim
that middle know ledge has not been refuted. Basinger's substitute principles are:
(3')

(4')

If it is in A's power to bring it about that P, and "P" entails "Q"
and "Q" is false, then it is in A's power to act in such a manner
that, if she were to act in that fashion, "Q" would be (would
always have been) true.
If it is in A's power to bring it about that P, and "P" entails "Q,"
then either it is in A's power to act in such a way that if she were
to act in that way, "Q" would be (would always have been) true
or the truth of "Q" is a necessary condition of A's having the
power to bring it about that P (MKHF, p. 334).

I want to say at once that both (3') and (4') seem to me to be true. And
Basinger is certainly correct in thinking that, unlike (3) and (4), his principles
place no obstacle in the way of the theory of middle knowledge. But are they
appropriate as replacements for (3) and (4)? In order to answer this, we need to
see whether (3') and (4') are capable of performing, in their own way, the
function which (3) and (4) were introduced to perform. That function may be
described, in general terms, as that of identifying various states of affairs which
are necessary conditions of persons' having the power to do various things.
Basinger evidently thinks that there are such conditions, and that in many situations (3) and (4) are useful in identifying them. He has no difficulty with the
idea that in order for me to have the power to see the sunrise, the sun must in
fact be rising, and in order for me to be able to ring your doorbell it must be
the case either that you already have a doorbell or I am able to provide you with
one (MKHF, pp. 333). But he claims that with regard to the sunrise and doorbell
examples, his principles and mine "come to the same thing" (MKHF, p. 335).
Unfortunately, Basinger is wrong about this. As he observes, his principles
differ from mine by replacing my phrase "then it is in A's power to bring it
about that Q," with the longer phrase "then it is in A's power to act in such a
manner that, if she were to act in that manner "Q" would be (would always have
been) true" (MKHF, p. 334). But this change empties the principles of their
force. In all four principles the antecedent of the conditional includes the phrase,
"and "P" entails "Q. "" But if "P" entails "Q," then for A to have the power to
bring it about that P just is for her to have the power to "act in such a manner
that, if she were to act in that manner "Q" would be (would always have been)
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true"! So the consequents in Basinger's principles fail entirely to specify any
additional necessary conditions which must be satisfied if A is to have th e
power to bring it about that P. The conditions specified in the consequents of
(3') and (4') are automatically satisfied if the antecedents of the conditionals are
true, and both "principles" reduce to the tautology
(T)

If it is in A's power to bring it about that P, and etc .... then it
is in A's power to bring it about that P.

The truth of this need not be doubted. But it can scarcely do the job for which
the power entailment principles were designed.
Basinger seems to see this, at least in part, yet he fails to grasp its implications.
With respect to his 'counterfactual' doorbell example (the one in which the
proposition represented by 'Q' is itself a counterfactual) he states:
In short, given (3'), the stipulated condition in question becomes
tautological-i .e., A has it in her power to bring it about that P only
if she has it in her power to bring it about that P-while given (3), this
is not the case (MKHF, p. 335).
Apparently, however, Basinger has failed to recognize that his principles collapse
into tautology not only in this case, but in all others as well. He has given us
no alternatives to the power entailment principles.
Huntington College

NOTES
I. David Basinger, "Middle Knowledge and Human Freedom: Some Clarifications," Faith and
Philosophy, 4 (1987), pp.330-336 (hereafter cited a, MKHF). Basinger is criticizing my article. "A
Refutation of Middle KnOWledge." Nous, 20 (1986), pp. 545-557 (hereafter cited as RMK).

2. See Robert M. Adams, "Middle Knowledge and the Problem of Evil," American Philosophical
Quarterly, 14 (1977), pp. 109-117.
3. It should be noted that, in counterfactual logic, the proposition, "If it were the case that P, it
might be the case that not-Q," is the contradictory of the proposition. "If it were the case that P. it
would be the case that Q." See David Lewis, Counterjactuals (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1973).
4. For this application see my article, "Foreknowledge and Necessity," Faith and Philosophy, 2
(1985), pp. 142-44.

5. RMK, pp. 553, 554 (numbering of these principles taken from MKHF, p. 331). At this point I
need to correct an oversight of my own with regard to principle (4). This principle is adapted from
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Thomas B. Talbott, "On Divine Foreknowledge and Bringing About the Past," Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 46, 1986, p. 460. In this connection Talbott states, "[IJt must. . be
stressed that the kind of necessary condition specified in [4] is not a logically necessary condition ... [Flof those of us who are not omnipotent, not all the necessary conditions of OUf having
the power to do something are logically necessary conditions" (Talbott, p. 461). Though aware of
this qualification, 1 failed to mention it either in RMK or in "Foreknowledge and Necessity", and
thus may have given some readers the impression that (only) logically necessary conditions were in
view here. (I am indebted to Larry Hohm for pointing out this oversight.)
6. It should be noted, however, that a proponent of middle knowledge might proceed by challenging
the first part of my argument, which claims that the agent named in a counterfactual of freedom
cannot bring about the truth of the counterfactual. If this could be refuted, then both the power
entailment principles and middle knowledge could be accepted.

